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2How Many Kicks at the Cat?1:
Multiple Settlement Protests by Class Members Who Have Refused to Opt Out 
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that any settlement of a pending 
class action be approved by order of the reviewing district court under Rule 23(e).2  This 
settlement approval, by right, is appealable by any “party” to the action. Since the named 
plaintiffs and the defendant have, of course, negotiated the settlement, it is an infrequent 
occurrence that one of the named “parties” would desire to appeal settlement approval.  
But a class action necessarily involves other participants, namely the nonnamed class 
members, whose status for purposes of appeal was unsettled prior to 2002.3  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Devlin v. Scardalletti4 solidified the right of class action settlement 
objectors to appeal the approval of a class settlement despite a failure to timely intervene 
under Rule 24 to become parties to the action.5  By broadening the range of participants 
who could appeal a settlement approval, and relegating the once-rigid definition of 
“party” to a context-specific question, the Court greatly expanded appellate rights for 
absent class members who become settlement objectors.6  Class settlement objectors, 
referred to alternatively as “warts on the class action process,” “pond scum,” and “bottom 
feeders,”7 may be among “the least popular litigation participants in the history of civil 
procedure.”8   Nevertheless, the Court’s decision enhanced, rather than restrained, the 
role played by the once unsavory objectors.  In doing so, the Court ensured that objectors 
could pursue their gripes regarding settlement adequacy beyond the settlement hearing 
and into the appellate courts.
However, Devlin concerned a mandatory class, rather than a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out 
class that allows putative members to exclude themselves from the class and litigate their 
claims individually at the district court level.9  Because the question was not before the 
Court, there was no discussion of the effect of a plaintiff’s failure to opt out of a (b)(3) 
class action, and then attempt to litigate, at the appellate level, his objection to the 
1
 Cats are frequently kicked at, though apparently rarely struck, in courts.  Most jurisdictions limit parties to 
one kick at the cat, see e.g., Conway v. State, 50 Wis.2d 152 (Wis. 1971) (“freely translat[ing]” the Latin 
phrases which form the basis of the res adjudicata principle, “Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa” and 
“Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” into the more populist, “No one is entitled to more than one kick at 
the cat.”) (quoting Hon. Lewis J. Charles, Res Adjudicata and Estoppel by Judgment, Wisconsin Bar 
Bulletin (June, 1959, at 25)); though there is documented evidence of one litigation party attempting as 
many as eight kicks at a single cat.  Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (“it is 
unfathomable …to remand this matter to give the claimant an eighth kick at the cat”) (Coffey, J., 
dissenting) (ellipsis added) (emphasis in original).
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)
3 See Section II.A., infra.
4 Devlin v. Scardalletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
5
 Prior to Devlin, the circuits were split on this question. See Section II.A., infra.
6 See Section II.B., infra.
7
 See Brunet, supra Note 32 at 411 (culling the less savory references to objectors).
8
 Id.
9
 Under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), a plaintiff in a class action for primarily monetary damages, as opposed to 
injunctive relief or a limited fund case ((b)(1) or (b)(2)), has an opportunity to exclude himself from the 
class litigation or settlement.
3settlement.10  What was made clear is that a person becomes a party, for purposes of 
entitlement to appeal, if he is coercively bound by a settlement in a mandatory class after 
having no opportunity to individually pursue his claim.
Following Devlin, the question remains whether such an appeal right inures to 
objectors who have failed to exercise their rights under subsection (b)(3) to opt out11 at 
either the class certification or settlement stage.12  At this point, the reader may be asking, 
“[b]ut what does it all mean, Basil?”13  Will denying or allowing appellate rights for 
absent members who have failed to opt out have any practical effect on class actions?  
Seeking to answer those questions, this paper will argue that failure to opt out of a class, 
either prior to settlement or at the settlement stage, should, in the interests of efficiency 
and equity, foreclose the opportunity to appeal a district court’s settlement approval.  
Section I discusses the multitude of protections available to absent class members, and, 
more specifically, the role of opt-outs and objectors in the (b)(3) class action settlement 
process.  Section II discusses the effect Devlin has had on the appellate rights of 
nonnamed plaintiffs, and details the attempts by subsequent courts to limit the scope of 
Devlin.  Section III outlines possible situations where this question of non-opt-out 
appeals might arise in a (b)(3) class, and concludes that limitation of the appeal right is 
the only sensible solution to this unanswered question.
I. THE PLETHORA OF PLAINTIFF PROTECTIONS IN THE CLASS ACTION
From the embryonic stages of potential class action litigation, numerous 
mechanisms exist to protect the individual rights and interests of aggrieved parties, 
particularly in the case of a (b)(3) class.  Despite the plethora of protections, 
disagreement persists within the academic community about how to resolve the tensions 
that exist within prospective and certified classes, particularly as it relates to 
representative plaintiffs vis-à-vis absent,14 or nonnamed, class members.15  The non-
10 See infra Note 51.
11 See Don Zupanec, Appealability -- Opt-Out Class Actions -- Approval of Settlement, 19 No. 3 FED. LITIG. 
16 (March 2004) (“The jury is still out on whether, in an opt-out action, unnamed class members who 
object to a settlement but elect not to exercise their opt-out rights may appeal approval of the settlement 
without intervening in the district court.”).
12
 It is entirely possible that certification and settlement occur contemporaneously.  See FED. R. CIV. P.  23 
annot.;  See also Deborah Hensler, Symposium: What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of 
Civil Justice on the American Economy and Policy: As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem
and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, n.47 (discussing the “settlement class action,” whereby a class is certified 
solely for the purpose of settlement).
13 AUSTIN POWERS: THE SPY WHO SHAGGED ME (New Line Cinema 1999).  
14
 The terms absent, nonnamed, and unnamed will be used interchangeably to describe class members who 
are not named as representative parties.
15 See e.g. Jocelyn D. Larkin, Incentive Awards to Class Representatives in Class Action Settlements, 
available at http://www.impactfund.org/pages/articles/Class%20Member%20Bonuses.doc (last visited May 
3, 2005) (noting that many commentators have questioned the propriety of incentive payments for 
representatives); The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S.274, 108th Cong. (2003) (Congressional 
legislation seeking, inter alia, the elimination of incentive payments to named class members); and
Deborah R. Hensler, Article: Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other 
Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 179 (2001) (remarking that, with respect to class 
actions, “[t]oday there is a sense again that monsters are loose in the land.”).
4exhaustive, mostly chronological, list of plaintiff protections, with some options not 
available in every instance, includes: the opportunity to be a named plaintiff or class 
representative, thus ensuring at least some measure of control over the litigation and class 
counsel; the right in certain cases (specifically those brought under section (b)(3) of Rule 
23) to opt out and pursue, or more accurately, preserve the right to pursue, claims 
individually;16 the right to move to intervene as a full “party,” which is available to any 
class member under Rule 24;17 permissive exclusion of class members by the court under 
the recently amended Rule 23(e)(3) in a (b)(3) class settlement;18 objection at the fairness 
hearing to a settlement under Rule 23(e)(4);19 and ultimately, in some cases, appeal of a 
settlement after it has been approved by a district court.20
In addition to these basic protections, several features of class action 
jurisprudence, and of Rule 23, are specifically intended to protect the rights and interests 
of nonnamed class members when those interests differ from their representatives’. 21  In 
addition to the numerosity and commonality requirements,22 Rule 23(a) requires that 
class representatives’ claims be “typical” of the class claims,23 and that the interests of 
the class as a whole are “fairly and adequately” protected by their representatives, 
including the named plaintiffs and class counsel.24  Rule 23(e) requires that a court 
approve any settlement of a class claim, and 23(e)(4) affords any class member the 
opportunity to object to a proposed settlement.25  Additionally, Rule 23(e)(3) allows a 
court to refuse any settlement of a (b)(3) class action that does not afford absent class 
members a second opt-out opportunity once the proposed settlement is announced.26   A 
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) advisory committee’s note (The advisory committee notes to the 2003 
amendments state that “Subdivision (e) is amended to strengthen the process of reviewing proposed class-
action settlements.”  The new (e)(3) gives a court discretion to deny settlement approval if a new opt-out 
opportunity is not provided at the settlement stage, because the “decision to remain in the class is likely to 
be more carefully considered and is better informed when the settlement terms are known.”)
19 FED. R. CIV. P.  23(e) requires that a court conduct a fairness hearing prior to the approval of any 
settlement.  The hearing gives objectors an opportunity, through counsel if desired, to voice their 
displeasure with the proposed settlement. A settlement will be approved only if it is “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.” Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); FED. R. CIV. P.  23(e)(1)(c).
20
 It should be noted at the outset, of course, that the grant of an appeal may signify a victory that is nothing 
more than Pyrrhic, as appeals are far more costly than opt-outs or objections, and courts of appeal are 
reluctant to overturn a district court’s approval of a settlement, in part due to the policy favoring voluntary 
class settlements, and in part because the district court’s decision will be reviewed with the heightened 
abuse of discretion standard. See e.g. Freeman v. Berge, 68 Fed. Appx. 783 (7th Cir. 2003) (“review of the 
district court’s decision to approve the agreement, however, is narrow; we will reverse only if the district 
court abused its discretion.”).
21 See e.g., In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass 2005) (compiling cases providing 
protections for nonnamed class members in settlement).
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) and (a)(2).
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
24
 The adequacy requirement is contained in FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
25 See Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Article: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: A Need for Technical Innovation, 
104 DICK. L. REV 653 n.107 (2000) (“The purpose of seeking objections from absent class members is to 
alert a trial court to divergent views and aid the court in identifying possible inadequacies in the 
settlement.”).
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) (2003 amend.).
5(b)(3) class action, one for primarily money damages, necessarily gives each class 
member at least one opportunity to opt out of the action.27  With all of these procedural 
protections, an inference arises that there is a preference for dissident members, and that 
members of the class who are not “playing ball” may have too many procedural rights 
that are otherwise not available to members of the class who are seeking resolution by 
settlement.28
A.  The Opt-Out Option in (b)(3) Classes
Devlin concerned a mandatory class, and its reasoning was based, at least in part, 
on the fact that the objector was part of a class where opt-out rights were not afforded.29
Nonnamed plaintiffs in mandatory (i.e. (b)(1) and (b)(2)) classes are in an awkward 
position; they are bound by the decisions of the named plaintiffs and class counsel, with 
whom they have little or no involvement or interaction.  The settlement that is to bind 
them does so “coercively,” in that there is no opportunity to distance themselves from the 
class, the named plaintiffs, or class counsel.30  The plaintiff Devlin, for instance, filed an 
individual claim, moved for intervention, and objected at the fairness hearing, yet 
remained a member of the mandatory class who was to be bound by the settlement 
agreement.  A plaintiff who is offered the option to opt out is in a considerably different 
position.  
The opt-out mechanism is the means by which a (b)(3) class member may choose 
who will represent his interests before the court.  By opting out, a class member 
“[p]reserve[es] the right to litigate individually, as one’s own champion.”31  By electing 
to remove himself from the class, the opt-out plaintiff “avoids any risk of the class’s loss 
on the merits and also forswears any opportunity to take advantage of the class’s 
victory.”32  Particularly with a settlement-only class or a second settlement opt-out 
available to comply with 23(e)(3), where the terms of the settlement, and by extension the 
outcome of the class litigation, is known, the decision to opt out is made with full 
information.33
On the other hand, by not opting out of a (b)(3) class, “the unnamed class 
members effectively cho[o]se their class representatives.”34  While this is not literally 
true, of course, in that nonnamed class members ordinarily take no affirmative steps in 
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(b) requires “that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests 
exclusion.”
28
 For an early discussion of this issue, see Timothy A. Duffy, The Appealability of Class Action 
Settlements by Unnamed Parties, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (Summer 1993) (advocating appeal rights for 
unnamed class members, a position subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court).
29 See Section II.B., infra.
30
 David R. Clay, Comment: Federal Attraction for the Interstate Class Action: The effect of Devlin v. 
Scardalletti  and the Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) on Class Action “Minimal 
Diversity” Concerns, 52 Emory L.J. 1877, 1904 (2003).
31 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003).  
32
 Id. (citing Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987)).
33 See advisory committee notes, supra Note 13.
34
 Clay, supra, Note 30 at 1904-05.
6the selection of representatives,35 plaintiffs who choose not to opt out are impliedly 
consenting to be represented by class counsel and to be bound by their decisions.  By 
foregoing the opportunity to exclude themselves from the class, class members are 
agreeing to “dance with them what brung ‘em”36 to the litigation in the first instance.
B. The Role of Objectors
If the opt-out procedure is designed to preserve absent class members’ individual 
rights to pursue their claims, the fairness hearing and objection procedure is intended to 
give nonnamed class members a voice in deciding the fate of the entire class, named and 
nonnamed members alike.37  Along with the “adequacy of representation” requirements 
of Rule 23(a)(4), objection allows absent members to assure that the named plaintiffs’ 
interests are representative of the other members of the class, and not merely clay to be 
manipulated by the attorneys negotiating the settlement.38  Objecting, then, is the 
procedural equivalent of nonnamed class members attempting to co-opt the named 
plaintiff “dates” brought39 by class counsel and disrupt the settlement the representative 
parties had reached with the defendant.
While the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(e) codified the right of any class member 
to object at the fairness hearing, the role objectors play in ensuring settlement fairness 
and efficiency has been called into question by courts and commentators.  This objection 
to objectors stems from the ability of a lone wolf dissident to single-handedly hold up a 
settlement that has the approval of the rest of the class.40  On the other hand, if indeed 
“[a]bsentees are the reason the class action device exists,”41 then the objection is the only 
tool available for the rights of members of the otherwise silent majority to be vocalized 
35 But see John Bronsteen and Owen Fiss, Article: The Class Action Rule, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1419 
(2003) (proposing that every class action should require an affirmative opt-in for a settlement class).  There 
has not been a great rush to adopt this proposed measure.  See Note 117, infra.
36 See In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943 (D. Ill. 2001) (appointing class counsel and directing 
lead plaintiff to “dance with the law firm that brung him.”). For an interesting note on the derivation of this 
phrase, see Brian D. Shannon, Symposium: “Dancing With the One That Brung Us” –Why the Texas ADR 
Community has Declined to Embrace the UMA, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 197 (2003) (attributing this old 
political maxim to University of Texas football coach Darryl Royal); But see also Patrick Emery Longan, 
Upper-Level Courses: Elder Law Across the Curriculum: Professional Responsibility, 30 STETSON L. REV, 
1413, 1426n.10 (stating that the phrase, if not the guiding principle, is peculiar to the state of Texas, and 
helpfully offering the sage advice, “I do not recommend the use of this phrase outside of the Lone Star 
State.”).
37 See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 403 (2003).
38
 Several commentators have questioned the role of named plaintiffs and their relationship with class 
counsel, See e.g. Larkin, supra Note 15 (summarizing case authority on incentive payments for 
representative plaintiffs and describing the “struggle” for class counsel in setting a fair bonus amount.)
39 See Note 36, supra.
40 See e.g., Rosenbaum v. McAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1442 (10th Cir. 1995) (questioning wisdom of allowing 
one objector to prevent the benefits of class settlement from passing to other class members: “[t]o allow a 
nonintervening class member to appeal approval of a settlement would permit one dissident--and there is 
likely always to be one--to postpone realization of any of the benefits that might otherwise come to the 
class members and to prevent the defendant from settling its liability.”).
41
 Id. at 419.
7and represented.42  The advisory committee notes to the 2003 amendments confirm that 
subsection (e)(4) preserves for members the right to object to any disposition that would 
be binding on them, including settlement.43
C.  Due Process Concerns: Other Means by Which Interests are Preserved and Protected
Already armed with the objection right, and with opt-out available as an escape 
route, is it wise to further extend procedural due process rights for absent class members 
in a (b)(3) action?   Mathews v. Eldridge44 is the leading Supreme Court authority on the 
contours and limits of procedural due process.  In Eldridge the Court defined the 
necessary rights that must be granted in order to preserve due process when an individual 
is deprived of liberty or property,45 stating that the “fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.’”46  Due process does not afford every person the opportunity to be heard at 
every level of tribunal.  The Eldridge court established a test for measuring the 
constitutional sufficiency of procedural safeguards that included an analysis of: (1) the 
private interest affected; (2) the risk that the private interest was erroneously deprived by 
the procedures used; and (3) the fiscal and administrative burdens to the government if 
additional procedures are used.47
In the situation of a hypothetical objector who has refused to opt out of a (b)(3) 
action, the analysis shows that her constitutional due process rights have been more than 
adequately protected by the procedures that stop just short of granting the right to appeal 
from any settlement approval.  It is axiomatic that not every class member can have a 
constitutionally protected property right in the settlement of her choice, but only in a fair 
settlement.48  The affected property right at issue then is merely an expectation right in a 
larger figure in settlement.  The procedure that ensures a fair and adequate settlement is 
the bifurcated fairness determination in the district court, which includes a fairness 
hearing and independent review of the settlement by the judge.49  During this process, a 
district judge “must exercise the highest degree of vigilance because in the settlement 
phase of a class action [the judge] is a fiduciary of the class.”50  A district court judge, 
then, acts as the surrogate fiduciary representative of absent class members during 
settlement approval.
42
 Of course, a court’s settlement approval necessarily requires an examination of the adequacy of 
representation, but the fairness hearing is an absent class member’s only opportunity to be heard on the 
record without intervention or institution of a collateral procedure.
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee notes.
44
 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
45
 Id. at 333.  The assumption that must be made to entertain this question is that an absent class member 
who receives a settlement that displeases him has a protected property right in the class settlement.
46
 Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
47
 Id. at 336.
48 See Bronsteen and Fiss, supra Note 35 at 1444 (“Not every fair agreement is the best agreement that the 
absent class members could legitimately expect.”).
49 See Larkin, supra Note 10.
50Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P'ship, L.P. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 212 F.R.D. 400 (E.D.Wis. 
2002).
8The administrative burden at issue if appeal is allowed is no greater than the 
allowance of any other appeal, but the concern raised would be that if every objector 
could simply appeal the settlement, rather than opt out, the class would have devolved 
into multiple individual lawsuits, but at the appellate, rather than district court, level.  
Allowing absent class members in a (b)(3) class to effectively leapfrog the district court 
step and take their now individual cases directly to the more crowded court of appeals is 
not consistent with judicial economy or logic.51  This option becomes particularly less 
appealing when the available procedures make the erroneous deprivation of a right 
unlikely; and the right at issue is a mere expectancy in a larger settlement.
If the denial of an appeal does not raise significant due process concerns, then it 
follows that the available procedural safeguards are sufficient to protect the rights of 
absent class members.  In addition to the opt-out and objection rights, absent class 
members may also collaterally attack the adequacy of the representation of named 
members or counsel in negotiating the settlement, which would only be necessary if their 
fiduciary in the judiciary52 was not up to the task.  Further, a party may undoubtedly still 
intervene in the action and preserve his appellate rights.  Given all the available methods 
for nonnamed class members to ensure that they or their representatives will be able to 
protect their rights, can Devlin possibly be read to extend to (b)(3) opt-out classes?
II.   DEVLIN CONSIDERABLY EXPANDED APPELLATE RIGHTS FOR 
NONNAMED PLAINTIFFS
Devlin’s central holding is that nonnamed plaintiffs in a mandatory class, despite 
their failure to intervene in the action, preserve their right to appeal a settlement approval 
if they have objected at the 23(e)(4) fairness hearing.53  The dissent,54 and a majority of 
circuits prior to Devlin, would have held that a nonnamed class member was required to 
timely intervene (and presumably also object at the fairness hearing) to preserve the right 
to appeal the District Court’s approval of a settlement.55
A.  The Pre-Devlin varied approach
Before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Devlin, the Circuits were split as 
to whether a nonnamed plaintiff was required to intervene formally under Rule 24 in 
order to preserve his or her right to appeal the approval of a settlement.56  The majority 
51See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“Since when has it become a principle of our judicial 
administration that what can be left to the appellate level should be left to the appellate level?  Quite the 
opposite is true. District judges, who issue their decrees in splendid isolation, can be multiplied ad 
infinitum.  Courts of appeals cannot be staffed with too many judges without destroying their ability to 
maintain, through en banc hearings, a predictable law of the circuit.”) (emphasis in original).
52 See Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, supra note 50.
53 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 14.  
54
 (Scalia, J., joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas)
55 Devlin at 15 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
56 See Devlin at 6 (discussing circuit split); and Clay, supra Note 30 at 1893 (same). For a lengthier pre-
Devlin discussion of the varying approaches taken by the circuits, see Duffy, supra Note 28.
9approach was that taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Guthrie v. Evans,57 holding that 
individual, nonnamed class members do not have standing to appeal a judgment on behalf 
of a class.  To allow appeals by nonnamed parties, without requiring intervention, not 
only would make class actions “unmanageable and non-productive,”58 but would “defeat 
the very purpose of class action lawsuits.”59  The “fundamental purpose of the class 
action” that would be defeated is the ability to “render manageable litigation that involves 
numerous members of a homogeneous class, who would all otherwise have access to the 
court through individual lawsuits.”60  Because of the availability of such devices as 
intervention, collateral attack on the adequacy of representation, and opt-out, the court 
saw no reason to allow nonnamed parties to appeal an order that is binding on the class.61
This approach was subsequently adopted by the Tenth,62 Sixth,63 Fifth,64 and Fourth65
Circuits, with an arguably stronger position being taken by the Tenth Circuit in Gottlieb 
v. Wiles. The Gottlieb court feared the demise of the class action device if nonnamed 
class members were permitted to appeal without intervention, saying “[s]uch a result 
would … eviscerate the utility of the class action suit.”66
By contrast, the Third67 and Second68 Circuits had followed the lead of the Ninth 
Circuit in Marshall v. Holiday Magic,69 holding that nonnamed class members have 
standing to appeal without first intervening, because “their legal rights are affected by the 
settlement.”70  It was this more permissive line of authority that the Supreme Court 
followed in Devlin, finding that the nonnamed class member was a “member of the class 
bound by the judgment,”71 and so clearly met the requirements of prudential standing,72
qualifying him as a party for purposes of appeal.
B.  Devlin and its reasoning
The Devlin Court73 justified its holding with the rationale that, following a timely 
but unsuccessful objection and an approved settlement, the interest of the objecting class 
member has sufficiently diverged from the rest of the class so as to require allowing the 
57
 815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1987).
58
 Id. at 628.
59
 Id. at 629.
60
 Id.
61
 Id. at 628. Peculiarly, the Guthrie appellant did not have the opportunity to opt out of the mandatory 
(b)(2) class, but the court nevertheless denied his motion to appeal based on the other options available.
62 Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 1993).
63 Shults v. Champion Int’l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994).
64 Cook v. Powell Buick, Inc., 155 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1998).
65 Scardalletti v. Debarr, 265 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2001).
66 Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1009. See also Clay, 52 Emory L.J. at 1893 (noting the Tenth Circuit’s adoption and 
expansion of the “judicial economy rationale”).
67 Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 1993).
68 In re Paine Webber Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 94 F.3d 49 (2nd Cir. 1996).
69
 550 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977).
70
 Id. at 1176.
71 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 7.
72 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 7.
73
 (O’Connor, J.).
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objector, in the words of one commentator, “another bite at the apple.”74  This result, the 
Court reasoned, is mandated by the divergent interests present, in a (b)(1) mandatory (i.e. 
non-opt-out) class, once a party becomes bound by a settlement despite his protests at the 
fairness hearing.  “To hold otherwise would deprive nonnamed class members of the 
power to preserve their own interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them, 
despite their expressed objections before the trial court.”75
Devlin the individual, interestingly enough, was originally proposed as a named 
plaintiff.76  He declined the invitation to represent the class, and pursued an individual 
claim against the disputed pension plan.77  Devlin’s individual claims were dismissed,78
and the (b)(1) mandatory class, of which Devlin was a part, was conditionally certified 
consequent to, and as part of, settlement negotiations.  Devlin, by bringing his individual 
claim, had unsuccessfully attempted to effect a pseudo-opt-out, and ultimately became 
part of the mandatory (b)(1) class.  He then objected to the proposed settlement at the 
fairness hearing and filed an untimely motion to intervene.79  Clearly, by exercising the 
panoply of available options, Devlin indicated that he wanted no part of the settlement 
agreement, and the Court sympathized with his plight, remarking that:
[p]articularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to opt out of the 
settlement, appealing the approval of the settlement is [Devlin’s] only means of 
protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he finds 
unacceptable and that a reviewing court might find legally inadequate.80
Justice Scalia and the dissent took issue with the Court’s loosey-goosey approach 
to “party” definition, derisively questioning the scope of the “oh-so-sophisticated new 
inquiry.”81  The offending inquiry, adopted by the majority, included the preface that 
“[t]he label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion 
about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”82
Perhaps more notably, the dissent questioned the majority’s “sunny surmise that the 
appeals will be few” in light of the new expanded rights.83  By requiring an objector to 
intervene in order to preserve his appeal right, the dissent believed district courts would 
be able to “perform an important screening function”84 and substantially limit the 
74
 David R. Clay, supra Note 30 at 1898.
75 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
76
 Id. 
77 See Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, No. 95 Civ. 
0742, 1995 WL 380374, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995).
78 Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int’l Union, 175 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 1999).  Devlin was 
eventually enjoined from filing any further individual actions after repeated attempts to have his claims 
litigated individually.  See Scardalletti v. Santoro, 172 F. Supp. 2d 744 (D. Md. 2001).
79 See Devlin, 536 U.S. 1.
80 Devlin v. Scardalletti, 536 U.S. at 10-11 (emphases added) (internal citations omitted).
81
 536 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
82
 Id. at 10.
83
 Id. at 23n.5 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
84
 Id. at 21 (citing Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 23).
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availability of appeal for certain objectors.85 Devlin did not address the question, and it 
remains open, what effect the opportunity to opt out of a settlement would have on the 
now-determinative “context,” and consequently the applicability of procedural rules 
granting or denying appellate rights.
C. Ballard and the Debate Over Whether to Apply Devlin to Opt-out classes
1. Several courts have since chosen to limit or question the applicability of 
Devlin.
Following Devlin, and with a particular focus on the Court’s “no ability to opt 
out” rationale86 for allowing the appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to extend 
Devlin to an opt-out class certified under the state class action rule paralleling Federal 
Rule 23(b)(3).87  The court repeatedly characterized the appellants’ failure to opt out or 
timely intervene as a calculated, strategic risk that they might become bound by the 
settlement.88  By objecting at the fairness hearing, but not opting out of the settlement, the 
objecting parties had, in the court’s words, “sat on their rights and waited until they were 
not satisfied with the way the litigation was progressing.”89  When the objectors finally 
moved for intervention, the court denied the motion as untimely.90  The Ballard
objectors, then, by “sitting on their rights,” had lost standing to appeal approval of the 
settlement, and were bound by a settlement to which they objected due to their failure to 
opt out.
Two federal circuit courts have subsequently endorsed the reasoning of Ballard in 
dicta.91  In Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.92 the Tenth Circuit passed on the 
opportunity to comment on the scope of Devlin93 when it denied the appeal of class 
action objectors who had failed to opt out of a (b)(3) class.  But, in doing so, the court 
noted Ballard, remarking that “were we to similarly narrow Devlin’s application, this 
entire appeal could be dismissed because Objectors did have the right to opt out of the 
settlement.”94  The implicit endorsement of Ballard’s reasoning was clear, as the court, in 
85
 536 U.S. at 21.  For instance, a district court could verify that the objector does not fall outside the class 
definition or that the objection has not already been resolved in favor of the objector.
86 See supra Note 80.
87 Ballard v. Advance Am., 349 Ark. 545; 79 S.W.3d 835 (Ark. 2002).  Ballard involved a class action 
usury suit certified under AR RCP 23(b), which differs from FED. R. CIV. P.  23(b) in that it requires 
predomination and superiority in all class actions, rather than only for (b)(3) actions as under the Federal 
Rules.
88 See Ballard, 349 Ark. at 549; 79 S.W.3d at 837 (appellants “had the ability to opt out and instead elected 
to object to the settlements and risk being bound by it”); and Id. (“appellants willingly undertook the risk 
that their motion to intervene might be denied …and that they would then be bound by the settlement.”).  
89
 Id at 546.
90 Ballard v. Garrett, 349 Ark. 371 (Ark. 2002).
91 See Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1185 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002); In re Gen. Am. 
Life Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litig., 302 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2002).
92
 314 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2002).
93
 Id. at 1185n.2.
94
 Id.
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denying the objections, stated that “the result of our decision is the same (unfavorable to 
Objectors).”95
The Eighth Circuit, in In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litigation,96
similarly denied an appeal from an objector on other grounds, but not before 
“question[ing] whether Devlin’s holding applies to opt-out class actions certified under 
Rule 23(b)(3).”97  Because the objector’s reason for disapproving the settlement (a 
provision that could have prevented some class members from participating) had become 
effectively moot (no one was denied relief),98  the court did not dismiss the appeal on the 
grounds that the objector had passed on the opportunity to opt out.  It is likely, however, 
that the appeal would have been dismissed for failure to exercise the opt-out right; the 
court questioned the applicability of Devlin to opt-out classes, asserting, “we believe the 
limited reading of Devlin has considerable merit.”99  The Eighth Circuit again, in Snell v. 
Allianz Life Ins. Co. of No. Am.,100 held Devlin inapplicable to an opt-out class action 
where the prospective appellant had opted out of the class, only to be later returned.101
The court refused to consider an appeal of the settlement approval, stating that “Devlin… 
does not apply because this is an opt-out class action in which [plaintiff] made no 
objections to the settlement in the court below either before settlement was final or after 
she was reintroduced to the class.”102
Following the lead of the Eighth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, in AAL High Yield 
Bond Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP,103 declined to apply Devlin or expressly limit its 
scope, but not without comment. The non-party objectors’ argument, the court stated, 
“misses the point of Devlin, which was to allow appeals by parties who are actually 
bound by a judgment, not parties who merely could have been bound by the 
judgment.”104
Finally, and most recently, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida, in 
Barnhill v. Fla. Microsoft Antitrust Litig.,105 has “agree[d] with those courts which have 
found that the basis of the Devlin decision was that the objectors were bound by the terms 
95
 Id.
96
 302 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2002).
97
 Id. at 800.
98
 Id. The settlement provided scores ranging from zero to three for wrongs suffered in a life insurance 
fraud case, and Henderson, the objector, was opposed to the perceived unfairness of a zero score, which 
would have provided no compensation to certain victims.  Because no zero scores were actually awarded in 
the settlement figure, Henderson’s objection was mooted.
99
 Id.
100
 327 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 2003).
101
 The plaintiff, Wolinsky, was readmitted to the class based on a telephonic miscommunication with class 
counsel. Snell, 327 F.3d at 667.
102
 Id. at 670n.2.
103
 361 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2004).
104
 Id. at 1310; (also noting that “this feature of Devlin has led at least one court to believe that it applies 
only to mandatory class actions.”  361 F.3d at 1310n.7 (citing Ballard and In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co Sales 
Practices Litig.)).
105
 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 4672, 2005 WL 766971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Apr. 6, 2005).
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of the settlement because they did not have the opportunity to opt out.”106  Because the 
Supreme Court had explained that this was the “‘most important’ factor”107 and the 
instant objectors had failed to opt out, the court reasoned that “there is no reason to allow 
them to appeal without intervening.”108
No federal court had yet expressly decided to so limit Devlin, but it appeared that 
this would be the path that courts were likely to follow, refusing to extend Devlin to 
(b)(3) opt-out classes.  This result appeared particularly likely in light of the fact that the 
majority of circuits, prior to Devlin, had refused appeal rights even for mandatory (i.e., 
(b)(1)) class members.
2. Some courts, however, have declined opportunities to limit Devlin.
But what confused and unsettled emergent body of law would be complete 
without a befuddling appearance by our friends in the occasionally wacky Ninth Circuit?  
In Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,109  the court allowed a group of objectors 
who had failed to opt out of a (b)(3) class to appeal the district court’s approval of a class 
settlement.  Finding that Devlin was intended to apply whenever a nonnamed class 
member was to be bound by the settlement, the court concluded that the parties’ appellate 
rights must be preserved, especially because the miniscule nature of their individual 
claims made opting out an unappealing option.  Noting that the objectors indeed were 
free to opt out of the settlement, the court (O’Scannlain, J.) remarked that “this ostensible 
independence is belied by an essential impracticability.  Because each objector’s claim is 
too small to justify an individual litigation, a class action is the only feasible means of 
obtaining relief…. They therefore occupy precisely the status the Devlin Court sought to 
protect.”110  So, despite the fact that the objectors had an opportunity to pursue individual 
claims as their “own champion,” because the ratio of costs to potential benefits of non-
class litigation apparently was unpalatable, they remained in the class rather than opting 
out.  Yet they were able to object to the settlement and ultimately (though unsuccessfully) 
appeal the approval of that settlement.111
The Tenth Circuit, in In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc.,112 without further 
amplification, contemporaneously held that “a class member who does not opt out of a 
settlement but objects at the fairness hearing and against whom a final judgment is 
entered has the right to appeal the district court’s approval of the settlement.”113  Though 
106
 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 4672 at *7.
107
 Id. (quoting Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10-11).
108
 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 4672 at *7.
109
 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Beckwith Place L.P. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 122 S. Ct. 56 (2004).  
110
 361 F.3d at 572 (Citing Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10 (“what is most important to this case is that nonnamed 
class members are parties to the proceeding in the sense of being bound by the settlement”).
111
 The appeal was, in the end, summarily denied and the settlement upheld. Churchill Village, 361 F.3d at 
577.  For an oft-cited district court opinion tending to side with Churchill Village, see Thompson v. Metro 
Life Ins., 216 F.R.D.55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying a motion to intervene, but indicating that the denial 
would not be prejudicial, per se, to the movant’s appeal rights despite their failure to opt out).
112
 354 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).  
113
 Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).
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the court held that failure to opt out does not foreclose appeal of a settlement,114 it is 
unclear what, if any, effect In re Integra will have on other circuits.  For one, the case 
involved a defendant class, which are, in the words of Professor John Coffee, “as rare as 
unicorns.”115  Perhaps more importantly, the case limited appeal rights to parties “against 
whom a final judgment is entered.”116  Even if we are to assume that a plaintiff class 
member qualifies as a person “against whom a final judgment is entered” when his 
objection is dismissed, his adverse judgment is markedly different than a defendant class 
member who is paying out the contested settlement. A plaintiff who objects, but 
nevertheless participates in a settlement (and presumably receives something of value, 
however minimal) over his objections, has suffered no real negative impact, other than 
perhaps the wounding of pride or deflation of expectations of a grander settlement.
III. LIMITING OBJECTORS’ APPEAL RIGHTS: ILLUSTRATIVE SITUATIONS 
WHERE OBJECTORS MIGHT SEEK TO APPEAL
When would a class member not avail himself of an opportunity to opt out, 
remain in the class, and yet insist on objecting to the settlement and then assert an appeal 
right if the settlement is approved over the objections?  From a (b)(3) settlement, there 
could possibly be four types of objectors who had failed or declined to opt out: (A) The 
absent-minded objector, who simply fails to opt out in the process either at an initial 
certification stage or an optional second (e)(3) opt-out; (B) The conscientious objector, 
who strongly disapproves of the settlement as a whole on behalf of the class for one 
reason or another; (C) The extortion artist objector, who opposes the settlement in the 
hopes that he can reap an individual payoff for eventual withdrawal of his objections; and 
(D) The self-interested objector, who feels the settlement does not meet his expectations 
of a class settlement, but who lacks either the resources or the leverage to pursue a 
greater amount or earn a worthwhile return individually.
A. The Absent-Minded Objector
It is unlikely that a party who inadvertently fails to opt out from a settlement 
would be able to, or even want to, later appeal an approved settlement.  First, the situation 
is not likely to arise with any regularity.  Settlement requires the best practicable notice, 
consistent with due process.117  It is not an absolute requirement that every class member 
actually receive notice,118  so initially there may be a number of class members who 
114
 Despite the odd procedural history of the case, In re Integra Realty purports to “answer[] the question 
[the Tenth Circuit] left open in Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., as to whether Devlin applies to 
opt-out class settlements.” 354 F.3d at 1257 (citation omitted). 
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 Coffee, ARTICLE: Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative 
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
116 Integra, 354 F.3d at 1257.
117 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that notice by first-class mail is 
sufficient to protect due process rights of absent plaintiff class members, and rejecting the suggestion that 
plaintiffs should have to opt in to class settlements).
118 See Id.
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would have opted out, but because they did not actually receive notice, they do not.  The 
possibility that notice is received and not properly understood, or received and ignored, 
always exists.  But in each of these situations, notice has been provided and the 
opportunity to opt out of the class has passed.  It is not entirely clear what purpose would 
be served by protecting the appellate interest of a class member who has failed to 
participate in the litigation in any way.   Rather, the efficient solution is to chalk this 
situation up to “rational ignorance.”119  “Rationally ignorant parties remain ignorant of a 
legal rule’s existence or lack thereof because the rule does not have any significant effect 
on them…. The market only pushes parties to gain information that is valuable or useful 
to them.”120  By denying the appeal right in the situation of an absent-minded objector, 
parties would be encouraged to discover their legal rights if it would have a significant 
effect on them.  If not, they should be left in their rationally ignorant bliss.
B. The Conscientious Objector
The high-minded objector who individually attempts to oppose the settlement as a 
representative of the whole class, and not for his own financial interests, is a rare breed 
indeed.  Perhaps he objects to the incentive payments made to representative class 
members,121 or simply because he feels that a critically important feature was left out of 
the final settlement package.  In any event, this admirable attempt to shoulder the 
objecting burden of the entire class should not allow appeal as of right after objecting at 
the settlement approval stage.  If there is truly something objectionable about the 
settlement, other members of the class will speak up, and a district judge will exercise her 
discretion, acting as a fiduciary for the class, to strike down the settlement.122  If, on the 
other hand this is truly a “lone wolf” objector purporting to represent some interest of the 
class that no other member has recognized, the court will likely approve the settlement.123
One of the issues a court examines in approving a settlement is the acceptance by the 
class. The presence of only a single objector, particularly if coupled with a low opt-out 
rate, indicates that a settlement should be, and is likely to be, approved.  Allowing a 
“crank”124 objector to uphold a settlement that has the approval of the class does not 
comport with judicial or economic efficiency.
C. The Extortion Artist Objector
119
 See Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't Hurt Them: Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of 
Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307.
120
 Id. at 340.
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 These incentive payments are routinely made to the class representatives for agreeing to be named 
plaintiffs, but run the risk of destroying class cohesion.  Judges, therefore, play an important role in 
ensuring the fairness of the payments. See e.g., Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 660 (2nd Cir. 
1981) (requiring heightened evidentiary support for class representative’s payments).
122 See e.g., Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
123 See e.g., Id. at 263 (discussing “reaction of the class” as a settlement approval factor and finding that 
low objection and opt-out rates indicate that a settlement should be approved).
124 Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (“A crank is a person inexplicably obsessed 
by an obviously unsound idea-- a person with a bee in his bonnet.  To call a person a crank is to say that 
because of some quirk of temperament he is wasting his time pursuing a line of thought that is plainly 
without merit or promise.”).
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The extortion artist, in contrast to the conscientious objector, objects with the 
purpose of holding up the settlement for his individual gain.  By burdening the class, the 
extortionist hopes that he will receive an additional payout from those parties to the 
litigation that are most interested in settlement.  While the crank conscientious objector at 
least operates with a noble, though misguided, purpose, there is no justification 
whatsoever for allowing the extortionist objector, whose object is merely to frustrate the 
settlement and extort a payment, an appeal right.  It is lamentable enough that the 
settlement is dragged out and payment to pro-settlement class members suspended.  It 
would be far more wasteful to allow these objectors, who failed in their extortion 
attempts and in preventing approval, to further prolong litigation at the appellate level 
while another individual settlement is negotiated.
D. The Self-Interested Objector
The only situation where an objector’s appeal rights should arguably be preserved 
after failing to opt out is in the situation of a negative value suit.  As in the case of the 
Churchill Village objectors,125 where the interest at issue is not large enough to justify an 
individual suit, the class action may indeed be the only feasible, reasonable method of 
pursuing the claim.  While the class device aggregates individual claims, in the negative 
value situations, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual 
suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or fanatic sues for $30.”126  Nevertheless, 
the infeasibility of the individual claim should not necessarily create appellate 
opportunities as a matter of right.  As discussed in Section I.C., supra, the interest 
protections built into the class action process ensure that a fair settlement will be reached.  
Further, the individual has not been denied all compensation for his claim.  Rather, the 
class action has made it possible to pursue the claim, a settlement has been reached, and it 
is only because the nonnamed plaintiff has not received enough that he chooses to object.
CONCLUSION
The suggestion that an “adversarial void”127 exists whenever class representatives, 
or their counsel, negotiate a settlement with defendants is overcome by the presence of 
judiciary oversight at the district court level of the settlement negotiations.  The district 
court’s review must be “exacting and thorough.  The task is demanding because the 
adversariness of litigation is often lost after the agreement to settle.”128  With this 
heightened review, and the role of judge as fiduciary, the class representatives have 
means by which they can protect themselves, including opt out and objection, and the 
assistance of the court in guaranteeing a fair and adequate settlement.  Allowing an 
appeal may simply go too far in providing an opportunity for a small minority of absent 
class members to try to squeeze the last drops out of a settlement.
125
 See Churchill Village, supra note 109.
126 Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.).
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By way of illustration, if the Ninth Circuit’s approach is followed, it appears that 
a plaintiff, injured or aggrieved in some legally cognizable way that affects a potential 
(b)(3) class, may first refuse to be named as a class representative (Devlin) or to 
participate in the class litigation in any way, then choose not to opt out, whether because 
his individual claim is not worth enough to pursue on his own dime (Churchill Village) or 
for no readily apparent reason (Integra), and allow class counsel and the named plaintiffs 
to haggle with the defendant over a settlement.  Then, once a settlement is agreed upon, 
rather than intervening, a plaintiff need only object at the fairness hearing (Devlin) if the 
settlement does not meet his standards, and his right to appeal its approval will be 
preserved.  This right of appeal, of course, would extend to all nonnamed plaintiffs who 
speak up at the fairness hearing.129 Is this a good result?
On the one hand, this result protects nonnamed plaintiffs in a (b)(3) class who 
could not or did not envision that class counsel or the named plaintiffs would possibly 
negotiate a deal that would prove to be so adverse to their interests.  However, there 
seems to be little justification for allowing a plaintiff to effectively opt in (by not opting 
out) for settlement negotiations, ride the coattails of the named plaintiffs and counsel in 
negotiating a settlement, and then object if class counsel is unable to secure what the 
nonnamed plaintiff desired.130  There are at least three checks already built in to the 
process to protect the interest of nonnamed plaintiffs in a (b)(3) class.  
First, plaintiffs have the ability to opt out and pursue the claim individually.  The 
plaintiff who does not opt out because it is not economically justifiable to pursue the 
claim individually (presumably because of court and attorney costs relative to potential 
settlement or damages) should not be heard to complain when “free” class counsel does 
not get them “enough” in settlement negotiations.  By choosing to stay in the class rather 
than champion their own cause, class members have ventured nothing and gained 
something, however minimal.  Further, where the terms of the settlement are known and 
a class member does not opt out, they should not be allowed to “spoil the settlement” for 
the rest of the class.131
Secondly, a 23(e) inquiry requires that a district court judge look into a settlement 
agreement to assure that the interests of the class are met, and that the settlement is not 
self-serving from the standpoint of the named plaintiffs and class counsel.  This function 
is best reserved for district, rather than appellate, judges.  The Ballard court seems to 
have recognized the folly in allowing plaintiffs to opt in (by their silence) to settlement 
129
 The author recognizes that this represents a simplification of the settlement objection process, but 
entrance of the formal objection, by all accounts, is not a cumbersome exercise, requiring little more than a 
note stating, “I object.”  
130 But see Shutts, 427 U.S. at 810 (“Unlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent class-action 
plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in 
knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection.”).
131 See Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977) (Denying adequacy of 
representation attack and admonishing the objectors, “[w]e believe that [the objectors] should not now be 
allowed to play the role of spoilers for a class of more than 31,000 people when they could have chosen not 
to be bound by the settlement.”); and advisory committee notes, supra note 6 (describing the full 
information and careful consideration to opt out when terms of the settlement are known).
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negotiations, only to use the objection and appeals process to opt out when the settlement 
is later deemed disagreeable.132  Finally, a State Attorney General or other qualified third 
party may be invited to serve as an independent, extra-judicial guarantor of the adequacy 
of the settlement.133
Ultimately, while only two circuits have weighed in on the issue to date, it seems 
likely, and advisable, that the other appeals courts will follow the lead of Ballard, and 
heed the language from Devlin suggesting that access to the appellate courts should be 
preserved only for objectors who are unwilling parties to a settlement. Courts should 
therefore refuse to give those who forewent the opportunity to opt out another kick at the 
cat when they are disappointed by the deal netted by their tacitly approved 
representatives.
132 Cf. Green v. Analytical Surveys, Inc., 84 Fed. Appx. 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff who opted out of class 
could not appeal after consenting to and then disapproving of settlement without formal objection).  
133 See e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3754; 2004 WL 504319 (Jan. 
07, 2004) (allowing New York Attorney General to submit, and accepting, recommendations regarding 
settlement figures and compensation for class counsel).
